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INTRODUCTION
State
Budgeting
and Welfare
Mothers

Governor Pete Wilson, who wields line-item veto power over the state
budget, has proposed a November 1992 ballot initiative that would give
himself and future governors more control over California's fiscal blueprints. The bulk of his proposed initiative is devoted to revising benefits
for welfare recipients, but two of its sections address overall state budgeting.
Simply put, a goal of the governor appears to be to short-circuit the 120member legislative process in favor of the chief executive's single voice in
times of budget crises. The governor could take command over spending
cutbacks under circumstances controlled, to a great extent, by the governor's own decisions.
This analysis looks at the budgeting changes proposed by the planned
initiative. We have solicited opinions from public-policy experts, academicians and other informed observers, with no stake in the outcome, and this
document reflects their comments and observations. Our aim is to jumpstart an informed public discussion of these significant, if somewhat
obscure, changes in the way California spends its money. We offer these
comments from policy and budgeting authorities as stepping stones for
further debate.
California's governors have the ability to make deep imprints on state
budgets and the many layers of government they fuel. The governor's
budget proposals each year become the framework used by the Legislature
in crafting its own version of the plan. The budget's crucial underpinnings
- revenue and cost estimates - are supplied by the administration.
Through the line-item veto, the chief executive has a final word in shaping
the product, sometimes molding it to his initial proposals.

No veto Governors can reduce or eliminate any spending proposals approved by
overrides the Legislature, except in areas constitutionally or statutorily protected,
since 1979 but cannot add dollars before signing legislative bills or new budgets.
Overrides of vetoed items require a two-thirds vote from both legislative
houses. No gubernatorial veto has been overridden in California since
1979.
Governor Wilson's initiative must garner 615,958 signatures from registered voters to qualify for the general-election ballot. The final deadline
is June 11, 1992, but the secretary of state's office has asked that signatures be submitted by April 17.
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND TAXPAYER
PROTECTION ACT OF 1992

Budget Governor Wilson calls his initiative the "Government Accountability and
Sections Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992." The attorney general has given it the
title used by elections officials: "Welfare. Budget Process. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute."
Its budgeting changes would:
• Require the governor to submit his or her proposed budget to the
Legislature by March 1 each year instead of by Jan. 10.
• Suspend the salaries, travel and living expenses oflegislators and
the governor if the Legislature fails to return a budget bill to the
governor by the constitutional deadline of June 15.
• Permit the governor to declare a fiscal emergency and reinstate the
prior-year budget, with some increases, when a new budget has not
been signed by the start of the fiscal year on July 1. The governor
could make budget-balancing cuts that take effect in 30 days unless
a new budget is signed.
• Permit the governor to declare a fiscal emergency if revenues, costs
or both are off by 3 percent after the new fiscal year starts. Budgetbalancing cuts identified by the governor would take effect in 30
days unless the Legislature by two-thirds vote passes an alternative
plan and the governor signs it.
• Permit the governor, during a fiscal emergency, to issue an executive order to furlough or cut the salaries of state employees who are
not covered by union-negotiated contracts to save up to 5 percent of
their pay.

"These budget reforms will help ensure enactment ofa timely and balanced
budget, and will provide substantial taxpayer protection against 'autopilot'
spending increases," Wilson explained in the 1992-93 Governor's Budget
Summary.
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Sections 4 and 5, printed below, contain the governor's proposed budgeting changes. Existing constitutional provisions proposed for deletion are
printed in strikeout type. New proposals are printed in underscore type.
SECTION 4. Section 12 of Article IV, of the California Constitution is amended to
read:
12. (a) Within the #l~t ten days ef each ealeAdar year, Ihe Governor shaii....Q:i
March 1 of eqcb calendar yegr. submit to the Legislature. with an explanatory message. a budget for the ensuing fiscal year containing Itemized statements for recommended State expenditures and estimated State revenues. If recommended expenditure exceed estimated revenues, the Governor shall recommend the source from
be provided.
which the additional revenues sl:1etlle

mn

(b) The Governor and the Governor-elect may require a State agency, officer or
employee to furnish whatever information Is deemed necessary to prepare the
budget.
(c) The budget shall be accompanied by a budget bill itemizing recommended
expenditures. The bill shall be introduced Immediately In each house by the persons
chairing the committees that consider appropriations. The Legislature shall pass the
budget bill by midnight on June 15 of each year. Notwithstanding Article Ill. section 4.
Article IV. section 4. if the Legislature fqlls to oass a budget bill by June 15. the Governor god the members oftbe legislature shall forfeit all salqry. travel expenses. and living
exoenses until such time as a budget bill Is ogssed god signed by the Governor. No
compensation shall be pqid retroactively to the Governor or the members of the
Legislature for salqrv. trqyel expenses. and living expenses forfeited under the oroyjslons of this section.
(d) No bill except the budget bill may contain more than one Item of appropriation. and that for one certain. expressed purpose. Appropriations from the General
Fund of the State, except appropriations for the public schools. are void unless passed
In each house by roll call vote entered In the journaL two thirds of the membership
concurring.
(e) The Legislature may control the submission. approvaL and enforcement of
budgets and the filing of claims for all State agencies.
SECTION 5: Sections 12.2. 12.5 and 12.7 of Article IV of the California Constitution
are added. to read:
12.2 (a) Whenever the budget bill bas not been oossed god signed by July 1.
the Governor mqy declare g state of fiscal emergency. When a fiscal emergency has
been declgred. the prior yeqr budget. adlusted as required by Article XIII. section 25.
Article XIII B. sections 6 god 8. Article XVL section 8. and stgte debt service. shall
become the stqte •s operational budget and shall remain In effect uotf! the legislature
Passes god the Governor signs a budget bill. In order to bring ontlclooted revenues
and exoendltures for the fiscal year Into bglqnce. the Governor may lmmedlqtely oropose reductions In any cateqorv of expenditure. lncll!ding goy state entltiemeot.
except expenditures required by Ar11cle XIII. Sectjon 25. Article XIIIB. Sections 6 god 8.
funding tor education qs proylded In Article XVL section 8. god stqte debt service.
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(b) Any reductions proposed under subdivision (0) shall become effective 30 days
after the oroposalls transmitted to the Legislature unless. prjor to the end of the 3D-daycalendar period. the Legislature passes the budget bill and the bill Is signed by the
Governor.

J2.5 (g) After the budget bill has been enacted. tbe Governor mgy declare a state
of flscql emergency god. In order to bring anticipated State General Fund revenues
and exoeodltures tor the fiscal yeqr Into balance, mqy reduce any cgteqorv of expenditure. Including any stqte entitlement. except expenditures p(Qtected by Article XIII.
Section 25. Article XIII B. sections 6 god 8. funding for education as provlded In Article
XVL section 8. and state debt service If at tbe end of goy auarter:

ill Cumulative tlscql year Stqte General Fund cash receipts fall at leqst three percent
{3%2 below revenues as estimated by the Department of Finance upon enactment of
the budget: or

ro

Cumulative fiscal year State General Fund expenditures exceed budgeted amounts
by three percent (3%): or

Ql Cumulative fiscal year State General Fund cgsh receipts fall qt least one god onehalf percent 0-1/2%2 below revenues gs estimated by the Deoartment of Finance
upon enactment of the budget god cumulative fiscal year exoendilures exceed budgeted amounts by gt legst one god one-half percent cJ-1 /2%).

For ourooses of fbis provision. 0 augrter is goy three month oeriod ending Seotember 30. December 31. or March 31.
(b) Apy reduction proposed under subdivision {g) shall become effective 30 days
after tbe prooosql Is transmitted to the Leqislgture unless. prior to the end of the 30-daycqleodar oerlod. the Legislgture enacts in each house by roll cqll vote entered In the
jouroql. two tblrds of the membership concurring. alternate legislation to bring anticipated revenues and expenditures for the fiscal year into bglapce and that leqjs!atlon
js signed by the Governor.

12.7 (Q) When a state of fiscal emergency has been declared pursuant to Sections
12.2 or 12.5. the Governor mqy. by Execunve Order. reduce tbe salaries of state
employees or furlough stqte employees. provided that the total reduction from such
gctions does pot exceed five percent <5%) of go employee's sq!qrv In any ooy period.
(b) The Goyemor mqy not reduce fbe salary of or furlough a state employee during
the agreed uooo term of a Memorandum of Understanding that hqs been negotiated
pursuant to Chapter J0.3 {commencing with Secljon 3512). Division 4. Title 1 of fbe Government code. which covers tbe terms god conditions of emoloymeot tor such emplovee unless tbe Memorandum of Understanding Itself allows such gctjoos to be taken
by the Governor or hjs or her designee.
I

<c> The jssuqnce of go Executive Order pursuant to subsection Cal shall not be
sublect to Chapter 10.3 <commencing wltb Section 35122. Divisloo 4. Title J of the
Goyeromept Code or the provisions of goy other state law governing salqrv setting for
stgte officers god employees.
(d) As used IQ tbis section the term ·employee· or ·state employee' includes those
employees defined in Government Code Section l9815Cd).
I
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State California budgeting is neither timely nor tidy. Priorities collide, conBudgeting flict and compete for cash in a state that, with each sunrise, is growing
is Messy more complicated and populous.
Resolution of budget disputes is hampered by a state constitutional requirement that two-thirds of the members of each legislative house approve the budget bill that goes to the governor. California is one of only
three states that require substantially more than simple-majority approval from a legislature for routine passage of a budget. It also is one of
only six states that require significantly more than a simple majority for
approval of revenue increases. (See Figures 1 and lA.) Consequently, a
minority of California legislators in either house can hold up passage of a
budget indefinitely by failing to supply needed "aye" votes.

Figure 1

States requiring more than a simple majority of
votes for legislative passage ofthe budget:
Arkansas
California
Nebraska

3/4 of elected legislators
2/3 of elected legislators
3/5 of elected legislators

States requiring more than simple majority
approval of revenue increases:
Arkansas
California
Delaware
Louisiana
Mississippi
South Dakota

3/4 of elected legislators
2/3 of elected legislators
3/5 of elected legislators
2/3 of elected legislators
2/3 of elected legislators
2/3 of elected legislators
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Figure lA
COMPARING BUDGETING PROCEDURES AMONG THE 50 STATES

STATE BALANCEll BUDGETS:
CONSTITUTIOJ'\AL AND STATUTORY PHOVISJONS
GUBERNATORIAL AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

State
Alabama ............
AlasJ.:a ..............
Arizona ............
Arkansas ...........
California ...........
Colorado ...........
Connecticut .........
Ddawart ...•..•....
Florida ...........•.
Geor£11 ........•....
Hawaii .............
Idaho ..............
Illinois ..............
Indiana .............
Iowa ...............
Kansas .............
Kentucky ...........
Loulsana ............
Maine ..............
Maryland ...........
Massachusetts .......
Michigan ...........
Minnesota ..........
Mississippi ..........
Missouri ............
Montana ............
Nebra~ka ...........
Jl;evada .............
Nt'l\ Hampshire ....
Ne¥> Jerse) ... . . . ..
Jl;e¥> Mexlro .........
Nt¥> \'ork
. . . . .. ..
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STATE BALANCED BUDGETS-Continued
'

'~

Stat~

Vlrafnla ............ .
Wasblaatoa ........ .
Wat Vl'lhlia ...... .
Wbcoasla .......... .
Wyomloa .......... .

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Governor
Legislature
Governor
must sign a
must submit a must pass a
·,Hay carry
balanced
balanced
balanced
budget
budget
budget
over deficit

s
s

c
c

Gubernatorial Authority
Can reduce
budget without Restrictions.
Governor
legislative
on budget
has line
approval
reductions
item veto

. . . (y)

c
c
c

c
c
c

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, Budgetary Processes in the States, 1989.
Key: C - Constitutional
S • Statutory
ATB - Across the board
MR - Maximum reduction dictated
• ·Yes
• .. -No
(a) Joint session.
(b) May carry over "casual deficits," i.e., not anticipated.
(c) Governor may reduce budgets of administration-appointed agencies only.
(d) Must have quorum.
(e) Budget reductions are limited to ex«:utive branch only.
(0 The Governor and elected cabinet may reduce the budget. The reductions must be reported to the
gislature and advice as to proposed reductions may be offered.
(g) If general fund expenditure ceiling is exceeded, 2/3 vote required; otherwise majority of elected
embers.
.
(h) After June 30, 1990, need 3/S to become effective immediately.
(i) Reductions allowed only to get back to a balanced budget.
(j) Governor may expend funds up to one year. Certain restrictions apply to ATB reductions.
(k) For emergency enactment, 2/J votes required.
(I) Governor has no veto power over the budget bill, but vote of 3/S elected required to override veto
11 other bills.
(m) For capital budget, 2/J votes required.
(n) May not reduce debt service.

Source: The Book of Stat<"s, 1990-91 Edition, Th<' Council of Stnt<" Gov<"rnmcnts, l..<:!xington, KY.

•
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2/3
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Legislative Authority
Votes required
to pass revenue
increase
Majority elected
SI lllt
Majority
Majority present
Majority

Votes required
to pass
budget
Majority elected
Sl lllo
Majority
Majority present
Majority

(o) May reduce budget of agencies under Governor's control only.
(p) Technically, the Governor is not required to sign a balanced budget, however, in order to consummate the spring borrowing the Governor must certify that the budget is in balance.
(q) May reduce budget without approval only for state operations; only restriction on reductions is
that reductions in aid to localities cannot be made without legislative approval.
(r) Emergency measures and measures that amend a statute that has been referred or enacted through
an initiated measure within the last seven years must pass both houses by a 2/3 majority .
(s) There is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the Governor submit or the legislature enact
a balanced budget. There is a constitutional requirement that the legislature provide sufficient revenues
to meet state expenses. The Governor is required by statute to examine monthly the relationship between
appropriations and estimated revenues and to reduce expenditures to prevent imbalance.
(t) Emergency measures require a 3/4 majority for override. Budget bills usually require Emergency
Clauses and therefore require 2/3 vote for passage.
(u) Governor r«:ommends a biennial budget that is subject to legislative approval.
(v) May carry over deficit into subsequent year only.
(w) Formal budget submitted by Budget and Control Board, not Governor.
(x) May not change legislative intent when reducing budget.
(y) The Constitution specifies that expenditures shall not exceed revenues at the end of the biennial
s)criod.
(z) The Governor has power to withhold allotments of appropriations, but cannot reduce legislative
appropriations.
(aa) May reduce spending authority.
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"The two-thirds vote on spending and taxing bills obviously
was put there (into the California Constitution) because the
authors believed a simple majority would create more taxes
and spending than they would like," says John Ellwood,
professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley.
But, he adds, "We have lots ofstates out there without the twothirds vote that have no indication of larger governmental
sectors than those with the two-thirds."
"I do not regard that (the two-thirds requirement) as a desirable practice because it allows a minority to hold the Legislature hostage," says Allen Schick, professor of public policy
at the University of Maryland and a leading national expert
on budgeting.
If the Legislature were to place a constitutional amendment on the ballot

to revise the two-thirds budget vote, it would have to do so by a two-thirds
majority in both houses. The same minority inclined to block passage of a
budget could block such a revision. Senator Bill Lockyer, D-Hayward, has
proposed a constitutional amendment, SCA6, to permit passage of state
budgets by simple majorities. It has cleared the Senate and is pending in
the Assembly.
Thegovernor'sinitiativedidnotproposethisconstitutionalchange,
although a simple-majority vote likely would expedite passage of
the budget.
Of the last 20 budgets enacted in California, only five met the state's
constitutional deadline for June 15 passage to the governor's desk. More
than half of the last 27 budgets were signed in to law after the new
fiscal year had started. (See Figure 2.)
Spiced by conflict and debate, this tardy brand of democracy can give the
appearance of operating in disarray.

"People confuse neatness with good policy," says Professor
Ellwood. "The public and press tend to assume an efficient
system is one where things get done on time. Wilson's plan
clearly appeals to a feeling on the part of Americans that the

system, because it's politics, is too slow. Deadlines are missed
and all that sort of stuff. California, lihe all ofAmerica, faces
real, substantive problems. Americans always, when they
can't agree on substance, decide to debate the process."
6

Figure 2
CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET, 1965-1992:

ADJUSTED FOR

INFLATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

Total Budgeta
($ Billions>

Populationb
(Millions)

Inflation Adjusted
( $ Billions)
Budget
Per Capitac

Bill/Chpt #

Date Passed
and Chaptered

1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70

AB
SB
AB
SB
SB

6-18
6-30
6-29
6-28
7-3

6-30
6-30
6-30
6-29
7-3

4.0
4.7
5.0
5.7
6.3

18.5
18.8
19.2
19.4
19.8

13.6
15.1
15.2
16.2
16.7

735
803
792
835
843

1970-71
1971-nd
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75

AB
SB
SB
AB

525/303
207/266
50/156
110/129
58 1525/375

7-4
7-2
6-15e
6-28
6-28

7-4
7-3
6-22
6-30
6-30

6.6
6.7
7.4
9.3
10.3

20.0
20.4
20.6
20.9
21.2

16.3
15.5
16.1
18.5
18.6

815
760
782
885
877

1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80

SB
SB
AB
AB

199/62
1410/320
184/219
2190/359
58 190/259

6-26
7-1
6-24
7-5
7-12

7-1
7-2
6-30
7-6
7-13

11.5
12.6
14.0
18.8
21.5

21.5
21.9
22.4
22.8
23.3

19.1
19.7
20.4
25.3
26.2

888
900
911
1,110
1,124

1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85

AB
SB
AB
SB
AB

2020/510
110/99
21/326
123/324
2313/258

7-16
6-15e
6-30
7-19
6-15e

7-16
6-28
6-30
7-21
6-27

24.5
25.0
25.3
26.8
31.0

23.8
24.3
24.8
25.3
25.8

27.1
25.8
24.7
21.4
27.6

1,139
1,062
996
846
1,070

1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92

SB
AB
SB
AB
SB
SB
AB

150/111
3217/186
152/135
224/33
165/93
899/467
222/118

6-l3e
6-12e
7-1
6-30
6-29
7-29
6-21/7-4

6-28
6-25
7-7
7-8
7-7
7-31
7-16

35.0
38.1
40.5
44.6
48.6
54.4
55.7

26.4
27.0
27.7
28.3
29.1
30.0
30.4*

30.0
31.6
32.2
33.8
35.2
40.3*
39.5*

1,136
1,170
1,162
1,194
1,210
1,343*
1,299*

Year

a
b
c
d
e
*

500/757
1XX/2
303/500
240/430
255/355

Total Budget dollars from the Governor's Budget Summary.
Population as of July 1, the beginning of the fiscal year.
Inflation Adjusted Budget divided by Population equals Per Capita
First year Budget was to be enacted by June 15.
Met requirements of Article IV, Sec. 12(c) of the Constitution.
Estmated figures, computation of final figures will be available next year.

Source: California Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee
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Flirting The California Constitution requires an initiative to stick with a single
with the subject:"An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not
Single-Subject be submitted to the electors or have any effect." (Article II, Section 8d.)
.Rule
The governor's proposed initiative reflects two primary themes. Sections
4 and 5 contain constitutional amendments to revise budgeting procedures; sections 6 through 21 would overhaul the state Welfare and Institutions Code to reduce welfare costs.
A dissimilarity in these two missions, one constitutional, one statutory,
could violate the single-subject requirement, rendering the initiative vulnerable to legal challenge.

"I find this wedding of welfare issues with increases in
budget control to be a sort ofsleight-of-hand effort," said Jon
Ebeling, professor of political science at California State
University, Chico. "These are things the governor would like
to have 'in order to more efficiently manage the state,' but the
budget is really a political document. It's not solely a technical problem .... I find it kind of unfair, frankly."
The California Taxpayers' Association, a business-oriented
lobby supporting the proposed initiative, counters that "welfare reform and budget reform are essentially the same issue."
It explains that budgeting procedures cannot be overhauled
without repealing mandates for growth in welfare spending.
(See Appendix A.)
The opening paragraphs of the proposed initiative also make
the argument that welfare and budgeting are joined: "No
matter how robust our economy becomes, the state will not be
able to finance existing programs at current levels with projected tax revenues. This is why welfare reform and budget reform are one and the same." (See Appendix B for full text.)
But there is room for argument. "I don't agree that welfare
reform and budget reform are the same thing," said Jeffrey
Chapman, director of the Sacramento Center for the U niversity of Southern California's School of Public Administration. "In my opinion, this violates the single subject."

Moving Up the The initiative would require the governor to propose a new budget to the
Budget Date Legislature by March 1 each year instead of January 10.
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"The amount of time available for the Legislature to consider
the budget falls from about 21 weeks to about 15 weeks,"
comments Ron Snell, director of fiscal programs for the
National Conference of State Legislatures. "The only other
large state with such a short period is New York, with 10
weeks for budget consideration. The brevity of this period,
accordingtothegovernorofNew York and others, isoneofthe
major problems with the New York system, forcing late
budgets year after year. Shortening the California budget deliberations is likely to increase problems, not resolve them.
New York is now considering lengthening its budget period.
"The revised schedule would also allow perhaps the latest
budget submission in the country. Forty-five states require
a submission with(in) one month of the convening of thesession. Thirty-five states require the budget to be submitted
within two weeks of the beginning of the session. No other
large state would allow so late a submission of the budget."
Each year, fiscal subcommittees in both houses have held public hearings
to pass judgment on the details ofthe governor's budget proposals, guided
by a comprehensive analysis produced late in February by the Legislative
Analyst's Office. Steve Larson, staff director of the state Senate Budget
and Fiscal Review Committee, says 12 weeks of hearings would be
squeezed into about six weeks under the governor's plan. "Huge parts of
the budget would have to be approved without any review at all," he says.
This year, the Senate leadership worked out a tentative schedule that
would condense budget deliberations into two months, with the aim of
passing a budget bill to the governor by May 1. However, the plan allows
six weeks of"wiggle room" for big-ticket negotiations before the constitutional deadline, a factor missing from the governor's proposed time schedule.

Chico State's Ebeling calls the March 1 date "nonsensical"
and without organizational rationale. "(This would) increase
pressure on the Legislature by reducing the time it had to
work. One of the problems in passing a budget is trying to
figure out what the hell's in there."

The Fine Print Chapman of USC noted a small change: The initiative says ifthegovernor's spending proposals exceed revenues, the governor must recommend
"sources from which the additional revenues shall be provided," instead of
the current should be provided.
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"It centralizes in the governor's office the ability to name

where an additional revenue source comes from," Chapman
said of the substitute wording. ({'Shall' means no discussion
on this. It requires legislative action to pass it, but the
Legislature could not substitute an alternative revenue source.
It seems to take away discretion."
However, George Gorton, strategist for the campaign to qualify and pass
the initiative, said its drafters proposed changing "should" to "shall" only
for stylistic reasons and that it would have no impact on the budget
process.

Failure to Meet Under the initiative, if the Legislature failed to meet the June 15 deadthe June 15 line for sending a budget to the governor, the governor and legislators
Deadline would have to forfeit their salaries and travel and living expenses until the
budget was passed and signed. (The governor still would have 12 days to
sign the budget bill once it reached his desk.) No compensation would be
paid retroactively. There currently is no penalty for missing the deadline.
This section is popular among voters. A California Poll released in February showed eight in 10 Californians believe the governor and legislators
should work without pay if the deadline is not met. (See Figure 3.)
Analysts contacted by SOR generally did not find this provision significant from a public-policy standpoint. "The salary forfeiture is just something to get the thing passed; nobody should have any problem with that,"
said USC's Chapman. But Snell of the National Conference of State
Legislatures called it "a sneer at the Legislature."

Said Snell: "I don't know of any states that have tried such
a measure in recent years, but evidence from before the
American Revolution indicates that losing a salary does not
force a governor into action. Colonial assemblies tried the
tactic a number of times, with almost universal failure. So
the fact the governor's salary would be suspended along with
the legislators' salaries and expenses is unlikely to induce
signed budgets. No one has tried this tactic with legislators,
and its results are unpredictable. But it is an insulting
tactic, contemptuous of the Legislature, in its implication
that the threat of loss of salary would whip legislators into a
spirit of obedience to the governor."
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Figure 3
THE CALIFORNIA POLL
Penalize Leaders if Budget Delayed?
If a state budget were not passed by June 15 each year, should the governor and state

legislators forfeit their salaries and per diem payments until the state budget is passed?
Oppose

No opinion

Statewide

83%

13%

4%

Democrats

79%

16%

5%

Republicans

87%

9%

4%

Give Governor Special Powers?
Should the governor be permitted to declare a fiscal emergency if the Legislature does not
pass a state budget?
Favor

Oppose

No opinion

Statewide

30%

66%

4%

Democrats

17%

79%

4%

Republicans

43%

53%

4%

Who Has More Support?
IfWilson and the Legislature are at odds as to how to reduce the budget deficit, and you didn't
know anything about the specifics of the matter, whose position would you be more inclined
to support?
Legislature

Governor

No opinion

Statewide
Jan. 1992
Jan. 1991

54%
47%

32%
38%

14%
15%

Democrats
Jan. 1992
Jan. 1991

70%
64%

16%
25%

14%
11%

Republicans
Jan. 1992
Jan. 1991

38%
33%

47%
51%

15%
16%

The statewide telephone survey of 1,028 adults, including 483 Democrats and 449 Republicans, was conducted January 13-18. The margin of error is 4.5 percentage points.
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A State of If the budget were not signed by July 1, the governor could declare a state
Fiscal of fiscal emergency and return to use of the prior year's budget. The priorEmergency year budget would be adjusted to fully fund Proposition 98's education requirements, state debt service and payments to local governments covering losses for the homeowners' property-tax exemption and state-mandated costs, as required by the state Constitution.
As one result of returning to the prior-year budget, a governor could continue existing spending for favored projects at higher levels than legislators might prefer.
In a sharp departure from current practice, the governor during this fiscal emergency could take steps to reduce health and welfare benefits and
other "entitlements" now protected by statute to bring the budget into balance. (Entitlements are government services that qualifying Californians
are entitled to receive.) The governor could propose cuts in any category
except the constitutionally protected areas (Proposition 98, debt service
and payments to local goverments for the homeowners' exemption and
state mandates).
He or she also could issue an executive order to cut by 5 percent the pay of
state employees who are not covered by collective-bargaining agreements,
as well as the pay of any employees whose agreements permitted the cutbacks.

The prior-year budget would remain in effect until the Legislature
passed and the governor signed a budget bill. The new round of
budget cuts proposed by the governor would become effective in
30 days unless a budget bill was passed and signed. But the
governor could veto the budget bill, and subsequent budget ver·
sions, in a drive to prevail.
Californians seem at odds with these provisions. The California Poll
showed 54 percent of those surveyed would be more inclined to side with
the Legislature than Wilson if a stalemate developed over reducing the
budget deficit. Sixty-six percent opposed allowing the governor to declare
a fiscal emergency if the Legislature failed to pass a budget. (Figure 3.)
The extent of change intended by this initiative is clouded somewhat by
its wording. It ignores a possibility the Legislature might override a veto
by the governor to enact the budget bill. Instead, the initiative states that
the budget bill must be si{Pled by the governor if a loss of pay or the
governor's own budget-balancing proposals are to be averted.
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On its face, omitting the veto option from this proposed constitutional
amendment eliminates its use in these specific budget areas, the Legislative Analyst's Office said in a Jan. 13 review. The issue "would be subject
to judicial interpretation," it added. (See Appendix C.)
The campaign's Gorton asserts there is "absolutely nothing in the initiative that weakens the Legislature's ability to override the governor with
two-thirds vote." That intent would have been clearer if the initiative had
referred to budget bills being enacted rather than signed.

What Others Long-term policy ramifications of this proposed initiative hinge on the
are Saying discretion of the state's chief executives. All sides agree it clearly would
shift control from the Legislature to the governor.
'~governor could

convey the power to declare an emergency
upon himself simply by vetoing budget bills as they are
presented on June 15 or after and in this way take control of
the state budget in any or every year."
- Ron Snell, National Conference of State Legislatures.

"To my knowledge, in no other state do provisions exist giving
the governor such extraordinary budget-making authority
as he would have under this proposal, especially since he
could apparently unilaterally provoke a 'fiscal emergency' by
not signing a budget bill by July 1. There is a potential in the
proposed reform for a lot ofpolitical gamesmanship between
the governor and Legislature, rather than serious attempts
at resolving differences. For example, there is the obvious
threat that the governor can hold out, of refusing to sign the
budget by July 1, and thereby provoking a 'fiscal emergency'
if the Legislature passes a budget not to his liking."
-Preston Niblack, RAND.

"It's a real power grab by the governor, no question about it.
The Legislature could balance the budget and send it to the
governor. If he chose for any reason not to sign it, he could go
into this new state of fiscal emergency and changes could
take place as he proposes to make them. The only thing the
Legislature could do would be send out another balanced
budget and the governor would still have to sign it or it
wouldn't take effect. He has, in effect, total control over the
state's expenditure program."
- A Alan Post, former legislative analyst.
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"What this reform is all about is to switch power from the
Legislature to the governor, so if a governor is a conservative,
after this reform you would expect more conservative policies.
On the other hand, ifyou had a Republican Legislature and
liberal Democratic governor, the Democrats might love such
a plan as this. It's not obvious to me on policy grounds that it
would lead to more conservative versus more liberal policies."
-John Ellwood, professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley.

"Obviously, this is going to strengthen the governor's hand
immensely. As it is now, even without these changes, the
governor pretty much controls the budget process. What
comes out at the end tends to be pretty much what the
governor wanted in the beginning. It seems to me this will
give the governor an even greater amount of influence and
control over the process. Not only would it further weaken the
Legislature's role in the budget process, but with Proposition
140 (the successful term-limit initiative) ... and lack of experience (among new legislators) in budget issues that we're
going to have very shortly, this would just compound the governor's role in getting his way in the budget process."
- Charles Price, author of "California Government Today» and professor of
political science, California State University, Chico.

"The bottom line on this is, it's a heavy-duty consolidation of
power into the governor's office. It's clearly taking powers
away from the Legislature and giving them to the governor....
and it's not very well written, by the way. I am not convinced
that we ought to be asking state employees to subsidize
through salary cuts the programs that the state undertakes.
It's a cowardly way to make a budget decision."
-Jeffrey Chapman, USC School of Public Administration.

"I think (this) is highly unusual and is, in my judgment, a
rather questionable transfer of power to the governor. A more
appropriate remedy (if the budget bill is late) would be that
the budget for the previous year shall continue in effect, and
stop there. Why should the governor's proposals have a
special priority if the Legislature has not adopted a budget?
If the Legislature has not been able to obtain a two-thirds
vote, the governor's own plan would take effect unless he signs
another plan. I don't think that's cricket."
-Allen Schick, professor of public policy, University of Maryland.
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Most experts contacted for comments on the initiative's
budgeting sections expressed concerns about the wisdom of
shifting budgeting powers from the legislative to the executive branch. But Steven Hayward, research and editorial director of the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, had
a differing view:

"... The governor's measure will restore a full measure of
accountability for public spending, where none exists adequately now.... Public choice theory reminds us that legislatures are especially vulnerable to special interest combinations. The executive, by the very nature of representing all of
the people and having to respond to all interests ... is less
vulnerable to these kinds of pressures, and is in a better
position to balance overall spending requirements .... The
defect of the initiative is that (it) excludes the Proposition 98
education earmark from the 'fiscal emergency' provisions.
As education is nearly half of the general fund, it should be
included.... I suggest two (alternatives): abolish all earmarking, so that all interests will have to justify year by year why
they and not another should get a share ofthe budget; second,
split the budget into separate appropriation bills for each
major department .... Spending grows about 2 percent a year
slower in states with these budget features."
(See Appendix D for complete text).

Pulling the Trigger
Since 1990, state law has permitted automatic spending cuts when revenues lag.
This "trigger'' can be "pulled" on July 1 if
the administration's calculations in May
show revenues will fall more than 0.5 percent below the cost of authorized services.
Cuts are pegged to the percentage of the
shortfall, up to a maximum of 4 percent.
(Constitutionally protected spending, the
same four areas protected from cuts in the
proposed initiative, are exempt.)
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The triggerwassqueezedin 1991-92. Inter·
estingly, Governor Wilson has recommended against using it in 1992-93, although it could cut spending more than
$820 million. Wilson explained in his Governor's Budget Summary: "Mter many
successive years of'unallocated' or'acrossthe-board' cuts, most state programs and
departments have made substantial reductions in the level of services. Further
reductions of this sort will simply reduce
the effectiveness of remaining programs."

Fiscal The proposed initiative would allow the governor to declare a fiscal emerEmergencies gency after the budget is enacted if any of the following conditions occur at
the end of the first, second or third quarters of the fiscal year:
• General-fund revenues fall at least 3 percent below revenues
estimated by the state Department of Finance when the budget
was enacted,
• General-fund spending exceeds budgeted amounts by 3 percent,
or
• Revenues fall at least 1.5 percent below estimates and spending
exceeds budgeted amounts by at least 1.5 percent.
The governor could move to reduce spending in more than half of the areas addressed by the budget, including health and welfare "entitlements."
Again, he could not cut the constitutionally protected areas: Proposition
98's spending for schools, homeowners' exemption losses to local governments, debt service and funding for state mandates. The governor's
reductions would take effect in 30 days unless alternative budget-balancing plans were passed by a two-thirds vote of each house and signed by the
governor.
During a state of fiscal emergency, the governor could issue executive
orders to reduce, by up to 5 percent, the salaries of state employees who are
not covered by union-negotiated agreements, and the salaries of those
whose agreements permit the cut.
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The state Department of Finance, an arm of the administration, puts
together the governor's budget proposals and revenue forecasts. Its forecasts have proven optimistic in recent years, resulting in significant
operating shortfalls.
The Commission on State Finance calculates that actual revenue
co1lections fell short of Department of Finance forecasts by more than 3
percent in 1989-90 (3.8 percent) and in 1990-91 (8.4 percent). This year,
1991-92, receipts may ultimately fall short of the forecast by 7.4 percent.
These revenue forecasts accompany the "May revision" used to craft the
final version of the budget. The magnitude ofthe shortfalls suggests that
in 1990-91 and 1991-92, the conditions for a "fiscal emergency" would have
been met within the first two quarters of the fiscal year.
Conversely, revenues were higher than initially forecast in 1984-85, 198687 and 1988-89. In 1985-86, they were roughly on target, the commission
reports.
Spending is a different story. Changes are less volatile in this area and
seldom exceed forecasts by the magnitudes cited in the initiative. Since
1984-85, spending has never exceeded forecasts by as much as 3 percent,
the commission says. But the commission in December reported that, for
the first time since 1984-85, costs this fiscal year exceeded forecasts by
more than the 1.5 percent figure cited in the initiative. The shortfall would
have been $650 million to meet the 1.5 percent criterion; it was $850 million.

"Litigation on this is going to be amazing. Suppose revenues
were down 2 percent and spending was up by 1 percent- that
doesn't fit in (with the initiative's conditions for declaring a
fiscal emergency). It's poor draftsmanship more than anything else."
-Jeffrey Chapman, USC School of Public Administration.

If the Finance Department's revenue estimates were unduly rosy, the
chief executive would be in a position within a few months to impose
cutbacks in programs that he or she considered low in priority. The same
would be true if costs were severely underestimated, as sometimes has
happened with big-ticket items, most notably Medi-Cal. If the Legislature
objected to the governor's cutback strategy and offered an alternative approach to budget balancing, the governor could allow his own plan to
stand. The initiative, again, makes no mention ofthe option of an override.

15

Money and Power:
A Look at Proposed Budgeting Changes in the Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992

Today, a budget stalemate means inaction until all sides can agree upon
a solution, always subject to retooling by the governor's line-item veto
authority. Under the proposed initiative, the governor could put his own
budget strategies into place, using his veto power to avert all legislative
approaches.

"This is authoritarianism, frankly. This is just not appropriate behavior. It increases terrifically his power. That's just
way too much power, I think, to have a balanced legislativeexecutive sort of group."
-Jon Ebeling, professor of political science, California State University, Chico.

"It's not uncommon in the states that the governor has significant powers to reduce some expenditures to bring the budget
back into balance. There's no uniform practice, though, as to
what happens. What I prefer would be some restrictions on
what the governor can do. For instance, it (budget cutting) has
to be pro rata, not more than 'n' percent; the governor cannot
take more than a certain percentage out of any program, as
opposed to this (initiative), which invites the governor to have
a hit list. A hit list might be composed of things the Legislature wants. I would prefer to constrain that power to ensure it
is used exclusively to restore budgetary balance and not to
enable the governor's budgetary priorities to prevail vis-a-vis
those of the Legislature."
-Allen Schick, professor of public policy, University of Maryland.
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APPENDIX A
Cal-Tax Endorsement of Taxpayer Protection Act
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CALIFORNIA
TAXPAYERS
ASSOCIATION
SUITE 800 • 921 11th ST
SACRAMENTO. CA 95814
(916) 441-0490

February 7, 1992

For Immediate Release
Contact: Ron Roach 916-441-0490
cal-Tax endorses Taxpayer Protection Act

The California Taxpayers• Association today announced its
support of Governor Pete Wilson's efforts to reform the state
budget process and turn off what he has called "autopilot"
spending.
In endorsing the Wilson-sponsored legislative package, CalTax President Larry McCarthy said the association intends to
support Wilson's proposed Government Accountability and Taxpayer
Protection Act of 1992 initiative unless the Legislature acts on
an equal or better plan.
"It appears to be a choice of this or higher taxes,"
McCarthy said. "The system needs fixing and the governor came
forward with a plan that has merit. We are respectful of the
legislative process and would prefer to see the reforms enacted
without the expense of a ballot initiative. If someone believes
there is a better way, we'll look at it."
Cal-Tax agrees with the governor that welfare reform and
budget reform are essentially the same issue, McCarthy said,
because necessary change in the budget process cannot be achieved
without repealing statutory mandates for automatic spending
escalators for programs with rapid caseload growth.
Without action to rid the budget process of what the
governor calls "autopilot" spending on welfare and other
programs, pressure for higher taxes will continue to build,
McCarthy said.
The governor's proposal is designed to give the Legislature
-- and the governor -- financial incentive to pass a state budget
bill on time. The state's fiscal integrity has been threatened in
the past by stalemates that have forced the state to go well into
the first month of the new fiscal year without a budget and its
authority to pay the bills.
Under the initiative, legislators and the governor would
forfeit pay and per diem for every day that they violate certain
deadlines for action on the state budget bill.
(over)
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Furthermore, if the Legislature is deadlocked on the budget
bill into the new fiscal year, the initiative would give the
governor emergency powers to use the prior year's budget, with
the ability to maintain balance with spending cuts. The
Legislature, by two-thirds vote, could override a governor's
emergency actions.
Cal-Tax also supports the initiative's proposal to reform
the welfare system with a plan designed to break the cycle of
welfare dependency and provide incentives for teen-age parents to
fin ish high school and able-bodied adults to seek empl-oyment.
The initiative also would remove California's lure of higher
welfare benefits for those who migrate from other states that pay
lesser benefits.
McCarthy noted an August 1991. Cal-Tax Research Brief on
welfare's alarming growth in the 1980s -- a rate of growth double
the increase in population -- and the need to lessen dependency.
A system that is open-ended with comparatively high levels
of grants encourages dependency, provides a strong disincentive
against seeking employment and promotes disintegration of the
family, McCarthy said. "It is expensive and, worse than that,
ineffective," he added.
The initiative would add to the california Constitution a
declaration by the people that "rapidly rising costs of public
assistance must be controlled if overall government spending is
to be reduced. Public assistance is not a fundamental right; it
is a benefit dependent upon eligibility and compliance with
reasonable regulations designed to minimize the burden upon
taxpayers."
It is clear that there will
problems unless the governor and
an initiative -- make structural
needed to budget spending within

be perennial state budget
Legislature -- or the people via
changes to provide flexibility
available revenues.

Cal-Tax is a 67-year-old nonpartisan, nonprofit association
that opposes unnecessary taxation and advocates efficiency in the
delivery of quality government services.
#
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Opening Sections of Taxpayer Protection Act
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INITIATIVE COOR JI,N

ATTORNEY~SA~~2tqi\ive measure expressly amends the Constitution by
amending and adding sections thereto, amends, repeals, and adds
--se-ctions to the Welfare and Institutions Code: therefore, existing
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in striltee~t ty~e
and new provisions proposed are printed in underscore type to
indicate that they are new.
PROPOSED LAW
SECTION l. This initiative measure shall be known and may be
cited as the Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act
of 1992.
SECTION 2. Despite repeated attempts by the people to limit
the size of government programs, the public sector continues to
grow faster than our ability to pay for it. california's
taxpayers must now work well into the fifth month of the year to
earn enough income to pay all our taxes.
' •. .
This is a burden that can only become more and more onerous.
The reasons why are autopilot spending programs, or entitlements
-- the prime engine driving California's perennial overspending.
·~--

California's fiscal imbalance is also reflected by a growing
social imbalance. In the past few years, welfare caseloads have
escalated at a growth rate four times faster than our general
population.
While california's tax-receivers grow quickly in numbers,
california taxpayers are starting to flee our State. This leaves
California with proportionally fewer taxpayers, and State
government in a perpetual budget crisis. No matter how robust our
economy becomes, the State will not be able to finance existing
programs at current levels with projected tax revenues.
This is why welfare reform and budget reform are one and the
same. The state's fiscal future is in jeopardy and reforms of the
budget process, including reform of significant programs of public
expenditure which have heretofore mandated automatic increases
without regard to the capacity of the state fisc, must be adopted
immediately.
We are willing to finance essential services. We believe
that the State has a responsibility to look after the welfare· of
individuals in need. But we declare that every citizen~1so has

-
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an obligation to do their best to contribute to the welfare of
society.
Nearly 77 percent of the State general fund budget is spent
on primary and secondary education, and health and welfare
programs. While education accounts for 44.9 percent of that
budget, an existing constitutional initiative (Proposition 98)
prohibits any substantial reduction in educational funding.
The existing budget process is not designed to reduce
spending; there is no expeditious mechanism for correcting
spending during the fiscal year when revenue projections·are·not
met or caseload growth exceeds projections.
The people believe it is time to take our destiny in our own
hands.
In order to restore accountability to our government, we the
people further find that it is necessary to reform the budget
process and the welfare system and do hereby enact The Government
Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992.
SECTION 3. Section 31 of Article I of the california
Constitution is added, to read:
31. The ~eople of the State of california find and
declare that l1miting the tax burden and reducing the.
size and cost of government are matters of statewide
concern and that substantial reform of the state's
bud et recess, includin addressin ma'or automatic
spen 1ng regu1rements, 1s necessary.

The rapidll risinl costs of publicassistance must_
be controlled i overa 1 government siending is to be
reduced. Public assistance is not aundamental right;
it is a benefit dependent upon eli$ibiiity·and
·
com~liance with reasonable reguiat1ons designed· to··
min1mize the burden upon taxpayers._
'l'he present open-ended welfare system andthe
comparatively high level of caiifornia 1 s arants
.
encourage intergenerationai welfare depen enfl, provide
a strong disincentive against recipients.see · ng.
employment, and promote disintegration of the family •
.-

. ._

~

.....,.

'

"

Welfare vas designed and intended~primarily as4a:.
safety net to provide emergency aid for a !lilted tlie.
Welfare must be returned to its pro3!r role as,a
transition to aalnful employment anself-determination.
and must inclu e an element of mutual obligation between
government and the recipient.
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SECTION 4. Section 12 of Article IV, of the California
Constitution is amended, to read:
12. (a) Wieaia eae firae !eft eaye ef eaeft ealeAear
year, !he Governor shall, by March l of each calendar
year, submit to the Legislature, with an explanatory
message, a budget for the ensuing fiscal year containing
itemized statements for recommended State expenditures
and estimated State revenues. If recommended
expenditures exceed estimated revenues, the Governor
shall recommend the sources from which the additional
revenues afte~le shall be provided.

(b)· The Governor and the Governor-elect may
require a State agency, officer or employee· to furnish
whatever information is deemed necessary to prepare the
budget.
(c) The budget shall be accompanied by a budget
bill itemizing recommended expenditures. The bill shall
be introduced immediately in each house by the persons
chairing the committees that con.side.r appropriations.
The Legislature shall pass the bttdg•t bill by midnight
on June 15 of each year. Notwithstanding Article III,.
section 4, Article IV, section 4, if the Legislature ·
fails to pass a budget bill by June is,.the Governor and
the members of the Leiislature shall forfeit all salary,
travel ex;enses, and Ivina e;ceenses until-such time as
a budget iii is passed an s1gned by the.GOvernor. No:
compensation shall be paid retroactively to the Governor
or the meliibers of the Legislature for·salary; travelexpenses, and living e~enses forfeited undir the
·
provisions of this sectl.on.
(d) No bill except the budget bill . .y contain
more than one item of appropriation, -aDd ~t for one··
certain, expressed purpose. Appropriatiou .. from-theGeneral Pund of·the State, except appropr~ations-for~the
public schools, are void unless passed~n~ach·house•by~
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two ·thirc!a. of.. the
aabership concurring.
- ... (e) The Legislature aay control the•submission-;
approval, and enforc-nt of budgeta~ud:..the=filing:;-.of.
claims for all State agencies.
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Han. Daniel E. Lungren
Attorney General
1515 K Street, Suite 511
Sacramento, California 94244-2550
Attention:

Ms. Mary Whitcomb
Initiative Coordinator

Dear Attorney General Lungren:
Pursuant to Elections Code Section 3504, we have reviewed the proposed
initiative cited as "Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of
1992" (AG File No. SA 91 RF 0038, Amendment No. 1). The initiative makes
significant changes to (1} the state's budget process and (2) state and local
public assistance programs.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS
STATE BUDGET PROCESS
The measure amends the state constitution to revise the state's budget
process and increases the Governor's control and authority over spending
during the fiscal year.
Change in Date of Budget Submission
The measure changes the deadline for the Governor to submit the annual
budget for the coming fiscal year to the Legislature from January 10 to
March 1. The existing deadline for the legislature to pass a budget (June 15}
would not change.
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Prohibition of Legislative and Gubernatorial Pay and Expenses
The measure prohibits the Governor and the Members of the Legislature
from collecting their salaries, travel expenses, and living expenses until a
Budget Bill is enacted, if the Legislature fails to pass the Budget Bill by
June 15th of any year. The measure also prohibits retroactive payments for
these expenses after the budget is enacted.
Governor May Reinstate the Prior-Year Budget if New Budget Not Enacted
The measure authorizes the Governor to declare a "state of fiscal
emergency" if the budget has not been signed by July 1. Upon this declaration, the prior-year budget would become the state's "operational budget,"
with certain adjustments, until a new budget is enacted. The amounts in the
prior-year budget would be adjusted to ensure the continuation of full funding
for the following purposes:
• The.minimum state funding requirement for K-14 education under
Proposition 98.
•

Subventions to local governments to replace revenue lost due to the
homeowners' property tax exemption.

•

State debt service.

•

Subventions for mandated local costs.

The measure also enables the Governor to propose reductions to this
interim operational budget, if needed to bring anticipated spending and
revenues into balance. These reductions may include reductions in state
entitlements, such as benefits paid under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and Medi-Cal, which cannot be reduced without enactment of
separate legislation under existing law. The four special spending categories
above would be exempt from these spending reductions, however. Reductions
also could include state employee salary reductions and furloughs that reduce
pay by up to 5 percent, except for employees covered under a collective
bargaining agreement (unless the agreement allows such cuts).
These reductions would take effect 30 days after they are transmitted to
the Legislature, unless the new Budget Act is passed and signed by the
Governor by that time.
Reductions to the Enacted Budget
After the budget has been enacted, the Governor could declare a fiscal
emergency and propose spending reductions to bring spending and revenues into
balance, if any one of the following criteria is met at the end of the first,
second, or third quarter of the fiscal year:
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• Cumulative General Fund cash receipts are at least 3 percent below
budget estimates.
t

Cumulative General Fund spending exceeds budgeted amounts by at least
3 percent.

• Cumulative General Fund spending exceeds the budget estimate by at
least 1.5 percent and cumulative General Fund cash receipts are at
least 1.5 percent below budget estimates.
The Governor's budget cuts would be subject to the same conditions as
reductions to the reinstated prior-year budget discussed above: they could
reduce spending for state entitlements, but not spending for any of the
protected spending categories (Proposition 98, subventions for the homeowners'
exemption, local mandates, and debt service), and they could reduce pay by up
to 5 percent for employees not protected by a collective bargaining agreement.
Budget cuts proposed by the Governor would take effect 30 days after they are
transmitted to the Legislature, unless the Legislature, by two-thirds vote,
passes alternate legislation to balance spending and revenues, and that
legislation is signed by the Governor.
Requirement for the Governor's Signature on Budget-Related legislation
The measure refers to the Governor signing legislation in four places
(references are to Section 12 of Article IV of the California Constitution as
amended by the measure):
• A fiscal emergency can be declared if the budget is not "passed and
signed by July 1." [Section 12.2(a}]
t

After declaring a fiscal emergency, the prior-year budget is reinstated until "the Legislature passes and the Governor signs" a new
budget bill. [Section 12.2(a)]

• Reductions to the prior-year budget take effect in 30 days, unless
"the Legislature passes the Budget Bill and the bill is signed by the
Governor." [Section 12.2(b)]
• Spending cuts proposed by the Governor to resolve fiscal emergencies
after enactment of a budget take effect in 30 days, unless alternative legislation is enacted by the Legislature "and that legislation
is signed by the Governor." [Section 12.5{b}]
The existing constitutional provisions governing enactment of legislation (including the budget), however, allow enactment of legislation without
the Governor's signature under some circumstances, either by an absence of
gubernatorial action or by the Legislature overriding a Governor's veto. The
measure would not change these provisions as they generally apply. However,
on its face the measure eliminates these alternative methods of enactment in
certain cases (for example, a Budget Bill passed after the Governor has
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declared a fiscal emergency or for legislation providing an alternative to the
Governor's proposals for balancing revenues and spending during a post-budgetfiscal emerg~ncy). This requirement concerning the Governor's signature would
be subject to judicial interpretation.
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February 12, 1992

Rebecca LaVally
Senate Office of Research
1020 N Street, Suite 565
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Rebecca:
I am grateful for the opportunity to comment for the SOR on the Governor's
budget initiative, especially since my views about the budget process are not
sympathetic to the legislative branch.
My general view is that our spending process suffers from some serious
constitutional defects, that we share with other states and the federal
government, and therefore that the Governor's initiative, or something very
like it (which I will try to spell out below), is urgently required. I rest this
opinion on the view that the Governor's measure will restore a full
measure of accountability for public spending, where none exists
adequately now.
There has been a gradual trend over the last 25 years across the nation, but
especially pronounced here in California, of weakening the power of the
executive branch to control spending. At the federal level, the most visible
aspect of this is the budget act of 197 4, which curtailed the power of the
President to impound funds, reversing a longstanding prerogative of the
President. This change means that Congress, and not the executive
branch, now controls the actual administration of funds, and not just the
appropriation of funds. There is a separation here between responsibility
and authority; the executive bears the responsibility for spending, but not
the authority really to control it.
The process is different in the states and in California, but the effect is
largely the same. Here spending is driven by the combination of federal
mandates, earmarks (Prop 98, 99, etc.), "workload" budgeting and
automatic COLAs. I will not repeat here the arguments against
earmarking and COLAs; I refer you instead to the paper I wrote last year

177 POST STREET, SAN FRMCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94108 (415) 989-()833

FAX: (415) 989-2411

for the Claremont Institute entitled "The Deeper Lesson of California's
Budget Crisis" (enclosed). The relevant point here is that state spending
proceeds larg,ely without accountability to either the legislative or the
executive branch. This represents a serious misfunctioning of our
constitutional system.
Public choice theory reminds us that legislatures are especially vulnerable
to special interest combinations. The executive, by the very nature of
representing all of the people and having to respond to all interests, as
distinct from the local or parochial interests of the individual legislator, is
less vulnerable to these kinds of pressures, and is in a better position to
balance overall spending requirements. As a single entity, there is more
accountability with the electorate than there is for the legislature. With this
greater accountability should go the responsibility for controlling spending.
The defect of the initiative is that is excludes the Proposition 98 education
earmark from the "fiscal emergency" provisions. As education is nearly
half of the General Fund, it should be included.
The alternative to the Governor's measure is to make some constitutional
changes to the legislative budget process. I suggest two: abolish all
earmarking, so that all interests will have to justify year by year why they
and not another should get a share of the budget; second, split the budget
into separate appropriation bills for each major department or category of
state spending. I base these ideas on the study of all 50 state budgets
conducted by former OMB director James Miller and George Mason
University economist Mark Crain, who found that spending grows about 2
percent a year slower in states with these budget features. (I have enclosed
a copy of the Miller-Crain article. I ran it off a computer on-line database,
so it is a little hard to read.)
It should be kept in mind that what makes for long term budget problems
are the margins; a difference in 2 percent a year in either revenue or
spending growth goes a long way toward determining whether we arrive in
such a situation as we find ourselves now. Hence, seemingly small
changes in budget process can make a large difference over time.
Cordially,

~?~----P

Steven Hayward

